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Summary 17 
Neuroscientific discourse on consciousness often resorts to „collection of elements‟, 18 
notwithstanding the Gestalt demonstrations against representing conscious experience as a 19 
collection of sensory elements. Here I show that defining conscious experience as an object of 20 
the category of conscious experiences, instead of as cohesion-less set of structure-less elements, 21 
provides the conceptual repertoire—basic shapes, figures, and incidence relations—needed to 22 
reason about the essence of conscious experiences and the essence-preserving transformations of 23 
conscious experiences. Viewed in light of the category of conscious experiences, designers of 24 
user experience—in designing pre-conceptualized user experiences—are well situated to 25 
contribute to the development of the science of consciousness.  26 
3 
 
What is consciousness? Consciousness, according to Koch, “is everything you experience. It is 27 
the tune stuck in your head, the sweetness of chocolate mousse, the throbbing pain of a 28 
toothache, the fierce love for your child and the bitter knowledge that eventually all feelings will 29 
end”1 (p. S9). This raises two foundational questions: 30 
1. What is the nature of conscious experiences? 31 
2. What is the nature of consciousness? 32 
How are we to think of the totality of conscious experiences i.e., consciousness? How are we to 33 
think of the constituents of consciousness i.e., conscious experiences? One obvious answer: 34 
Conscious experiences are objects of the category of all conscious experiences and 35 
consciousness is the category of conscious experiences. In other words, every conscious 36 
experience has the essence of the category of conscious experiences, whatever the essence(s) 37 
maybe. This characterization is in the spirit of asserting that a chair is an object of the category 38 
of chairs. 39 
   Let us consider a visual experience: a face. A first-order approximation would represent the 40 
experience as a feature list, as a point in a feature-space, or as a set of features: Face = {eyes, 41 
nose, mouth}
2
. Sensory features are obviously structured, unlike the structure-less elements of 42 
sets
3
 (p. 1). Equally importantly, sensory features of a visual object are related to one another in 43 
specific ways resulting in a cohesive object, which cannot be modeled by a set with its zero 44 
internal cohesion
4
 (p. 146). Elementism, notwithstanding the Gestalt demonstrations
5
 (p. S34), 45 
continues to be the default terminology as in analyzing “perceptual experience into a collection 46 
of simple sensory elements”6 (p. 19). Along similar lines, mind is defined as a set of brain 47 
functions (p. 68 in ref. 
7
; p. 546 in ref. 
8
). The claim that „mind is a set‟ is repeatedly asserted in 48 
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the textbook Principles of Neural Science
9
 (p. 5, 334, 384), which takes on added significance in 49 
light of its pedagogical value in training neuroscientists. Of course, this terminology does not 50 
reflect any failure to recognize that, in terms of the above example of face perception, the 51 
constituent eyes, nose, and mouth, unlike the structure-less elements of a set, are figures of 52 
various shapes; and that these figures constituting a face are related to one another in specific 53 
ways. Nevertheless, it does highlight the absence and the significance of having a conceptual 54 
repertoire that fits the reality of conscious experiences. 55 
   Here I put forward mathematical category
4
 (p. 21, 135-148) as a construct suited for the study 56 
of consciousness. In line with the commonplace understanding of the notion of category, a 57 
mathematical category consists of objects all of which partake in the essence that is characteristic 58 
of the category; since every object of the category partakes in the essence, the transformations of 59 
objects preserve the essence (e.g. in the category of dogs, a transformation of an young dog into 60 
an old dog preserves the “dogness”). 61 
 62 
Theory of Conscious Experiences 63 
What is the essence of conscious experiences? Continuing with our example of face perception, 64 
an experience of a face can be said to consist of figures of various shapes: two eye-shaped 65 
figures, one nosed-shaped figure, and one mouth-shaped figure. Of these shapes, we can say that 66 
eye, nose, and mouth are the basic shapes, and their incidence relations determine the mutual 67 
relations between various basic-shaped figures constituting the face
4
 (pp. 82-83, 250-253). When 68 
considering conscious experience in general, we may treat sensory features (e.g. color, shape), 69 
modalities (visual, tactile, etc.), and emotion, among others, as basic shapes. For example, anger 70 
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(in conscious experience) can be considered as an emotion-shaped figure (in the experience) just 71 
as redness can be thought of as a color-shaped figure. The mutual relations between basic shapes, 72 
say, emotion and color, determine the mutual relations between figures of the corresponding 73 
shapes (anger and redness). 74 
   Basic shapes along with their incidence relations constitute the abstract essence or theory of the 75 
category of conscious experiences (pp. 154-155, 235-236 in ref. 
3
; pp. 149-151, 369-370 in ref. 
4
; 76 
p. 215, 217 in ref. 
10
; pp. 10-12 in ref. 
11
). First, every experience has the essence [of 77 
experiences] given by the basic shapes and their incidence relations. Next, every experience can 78 
be represented as a structure formed of the basic-shaped figures and their mutual relations 79 
induced by the incidences of basic shapes (Fig. 4 in ref. 
12
). Since every experience has the 80 
essence of experiences, transformations of experiences are required to preserve the essence of 81 
experiences, and as such are natural transformations. Geometrically speaking, natural 82 
transformations „do not tear‟ the structure transformed4 (p. 210). Philosophically, a natural 83 
transformation is: Becoming consistent with Being
13
 (e.g. biological growth). 84 
   What are we to make of the totality of all conscious experiences along with their essence-85 
preserving transformations? Objects along with essence-preserving morphisms of objects form a 86 
category. With conscious experiences as objects and essence-preserving transformations of 87 
experiences as structure-preserving morphisms of objects, consciousness—the totality of 88 
conscious experiences—can be construed as a category of conscious experiences4 (p. 21, 152-89 
154, 321-322). Note that any experience can remain the same (identity transformation). If I went 90 
from sad to happy and from happy to detached, then I went from sad to detached (composition of 91 
transformations of experiences). Along these lines, the other axioms and laws, which are 92 
required to be satisfied in order for us to talk about a category of conscious experiences, can be 93 
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verified. Within this categorical framework, the structure of consciousness is an external 94 
reflection of the structural essence of conscious experiences
14
 (p. 10). More immediately, a 95 
category embodies a mode of cohesion
4
 (p. 146), which is the most basic attribute of conscious 96 
experience. For example, parts (hands, legs, etc.) of a body have a mode of cohesion, which is 97 
different from the mode of cohesion of parts (color, shape) of a visual object. Note that „part‟ is 98 
both itself and its relationship to the whole
15
 (pp. 53-55). 99 
   As an illustration of theory of a category and its basic shapes, I present simple theories 100 
(abstract essences) of conscious experiences. More explicitly, the mathematical method, 101 
according to F. William Lawvere, “consists of taking the main structure [of an object] by itself as 102 
a first approximation to a theory of the object, i.e. mentally operating as though all further 103 
structure of the object simply did not exist”14 (pp. 9-10). With „interpretation of sensation‟ as a 104 
theory of conscious experiences, we obtain a category of two-sequential processes as the 105 
category of conscious experiences. Here, the basic shapes are physical stimuli, neural sensation 106 
of stimuli, and conscious interpretation of sensation. With conscious experience as an object of 107 
the category of two sequential functions, we find that the objective logic intrinsic to 108 
consciousness is non-Boolean; for example, it has four truth values
12
 (pp. 172-174). 109 
Alternatively, we can take „action of memory on sensation‟ as a theory of conscious experiences. 110 
Yet another example of an abstract theory of conscious experiences: „particular as an exemplar 111 
of a general‟9 (pp. 628-630), which gives the category of idempotents as the category of 112 
conscious experiences
4
 (p. 106). 113 
   Given a category of conscious experiences, how do we abstract the theory (essence) of 114 
experiences? Theorization begins with measurements of properties of the objects of the given 115 
category. Oftentimes, we find that there is small subcategory of properties (and their 116 
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determinations) within the category of all properties that constitutes the abstract essence shared 117 
by all objects of the given category. This abstract essence in which every object of a given 118 
category partakes is the theory of the given category (pp. 154-155 in ref. 
3
; pp. 149-150 in ref. 
4
; 119 
Fig. 5 in ref. 
12
; pp. 44-47 in ref. 
14
). In geometric terminology, we consider a subcategory of 120 
basic shapes and their incidence relations, and examine if figures with objects in the subcategory 121 
as shapes are adequate to completely characterize every object of the category and tell apart 122 
transformations between objects (pp. 370-371 in ref. 
4
; p. 49 in ref. 
15
). 123 
 124 
Designing User Experiences 125 
We now view user experience design in light of the category of conscious experiences. Let us 126 
say you were to design an artifact that elicits a specific experience, say, religious experience
16
. 127 
You imagine a category of artifacts (along with their mutual relations). Next, you measure the 128 
values of their properties and examine their mutual determination. On further examination, you 129 
find within this category of properties (and determinations), there is a subcategory of properties, 130 
which is essential for the elicitation of the specific experience (cf. raised gaze for religious 131 
experience). This essence is the theory of the category of artifacts (eliciting the desired 132 
experience). Now that you have the essence („raising the gaze‟) of the category of religious 133 
buildings, you interpret the essence (theory) into a background category of, say, brick and mortar 134 
to obtain a model of the theory of your imagined category of religious buildings
15
 (pp. 44-47). 135 
Within this broad categorical framework, we can accommodate distinct experiences elicited by 136 
different architectural designs
17
 (p. 201). 137 
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   In the context of developing a scientific theory of conscious experience, it is important to 138 
recognize change-of-experience as intrinsic to the practice of design. Neuroscientists vary stimuli 139 
and examine the corresponding changes in conscious experience. So do designers of user 140 
experience. Designers of user experience, by way of changing the basic shapes (e.g. sensory 141 
features, modalities) and their incidence relations constituting the essence or theory of desired 142 
experiences, are designing experiences ranging from ordinary experiences with the usual subject-143 
object divide and all the way to aesthetic and spiritual experiences variously described as „figure-144 
sans-background‟, „disappearing into appearance‟, or „losing oneself‟ (cf. music18). Here, 145 
material objects are designed to elicit a pre-conceptualized experience. In designing experience, 146 
design subsumes specification of the experience (in terms of figures of various basic shapes and 147 
their incidences) and its essence-preserving transformations from and to experiences of the 148 
category of experiences. Since theory is the essence of practices extracted from a conscious 149 
participation in the practice
10
 (p. 215), a theory of experiences can be abstracted from conscious 150 
participation in the practice of designing user experiences. Furthermore, changing theories and 151 
the induced changes in experiences are integral to designing user experiences. Equally 152 
importantly, the wealth of empirical data accumulated in designing user experiences is a valuable 153 
resource to draw upon in testing for the adequacy of theories of consciousness. 154 
 155 
Conclusions 156 
I defined conscious experience as an object of the category of conscious experiences, which 157 
aligns with the intuitions engendered by our everyday experience with things and thoughts (cf. 158 
an idea is an object of a category of ideas). It is fascinating to note that the most advanced 159 
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scientific understanding of object (as an object of a category of objects) is in accord with our 160 
ordinary experience. The category of conscious experiences provides the conceptual repertoire—161 
basic shapes, figures, and incidences—needed to develop an adequately explicit theory of 162 
conscious experiences. In doing so, it brings into focus the significance of user experience design 163 
in the development of a comprehensive theory of consciousness.  164 
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